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Cyberwar, Netwar And The Revolution In Military Affairs - Isbn:9780230625839

Category: Political Science

  • Book Title: Cyberwar, Netwar and the Revolution in Military Affairs
  • ISBN 13: 9780230625839
  • ISBN 10: 0230625835
  • Author: E. Halpin, P. Trevorrow, D. Webb, S. Wright
  • Category: Political Science
  • Category (general): Political Science
  • Publisher: Springer
  • Format & Number of pages: 253 pages, book
  • Synopsis: Suppose that China or Russia had declared an intention to achieve full spectrum dominance in the military sphere, including space, by the year 2020. Assume further that the chief of Russia's or China's uniformed military services had said that ...

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The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia

Dima Adamsky, "The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel."
Publisher: Stanford Security Studies | 2010 | ISBN 0804769516 | PDF | 248 pages | 2.4 MB


This book studies the impact of cultural factors on the course of military innovations. One would expect that countries accustomed to similar technologies would undergo analogous changes in their perception of and approach to warfare. However, the intellectual history of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in Russia, the US, and Israel indicates the opposite. The US developed technology and weaponry for about a decade without reconceptualizing the existing paradigm about the nature of warfare. Soviet 'new theory of victory' represented a conceptualization which chronologically preceded technological procurement. Israel was the first to utilize the weaponry on the battlefield, but was the last to develop a conceptual framework that acknowledged its revolutionary implications.
Utilizing primary sources that had previously been completely inaccessible, and borrowing methods of analysis from political science, history, anthropology, and cognitive psychology, this book suggests a cultural explanation for this puzzling transformation in warfare.
The Culture of Military Innovation offers a systematic, thorough, and unique analytical approach that may well be applicable in other perplexing strategic situations. Though framed in the context of specific historical experience, the insights of this book reveal important implications related to conventional, subconventional, and nonconventional security issues. It is therefore an ideal reference work for practitioners, scholars, teachers, and students of security studies.

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  1. Ebooks list page. 7929
  2. 2011-11-25 Infinite Intensity: The Revolution is Here
  3. 2011-11-05 Preparing for the Revolution. Information Technology and the Future of the Research University
  4. 2012-06-11 The Designful Company: How to Build a Culture of Nonstop Innovation
  5. 2016-09-24 To Defend the Revolution Is to Defend Culture The Cultural Policy of the Cuban Revolution
  6. 2014-03-26 War & Destiny: How the Bush Revolution in Foreign and Military Affairs Redefined American Power (repost)
  7. 2011-09-25 The Revolution in Military Affairs (Foreign Policy, Security and Strategic Studies)
  8. 2011-04-15 Leading the Revolution. How to Thrive in Turbulent Times by Making Innovation a Way of Life By Gary Hamel
  9. 2010-11-02 A Military History of Russia. From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya (Repost)
  10. 2010-10-13 The Year in Veterans Affairs & Military Medicine 2010-2011 Edition
  11. 2010-05-01 Leading the Revolution. How to Thrive in Turbulent Times by Making Innovation a Way o
  12. 2010-02-28 The Long Search for a Surgical Strike: Precision Munitions and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Cadre Paper, 12.)
  13. 2010-02-06 Strategy for Chaos. Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History - Removed
  14. 2010-01-18 Leading the Revolution. How to Thrive in Turbulent Times by Making Innovation a Way of Life
  15. 2010-01-09 Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A Revolution in Military Affairs. (Cass Military Studies)
  16. 2009-10-25 A Military History of Russia. From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya
  17. 2009-07-15 Cyberwar, Netwar and the Revolution in Military Affairs
  18. 2009-06-09 War & Destiny: How the Bush Revolution in Foreign and Military Affairs Redefined American Power
  19. 2009-02-22 Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and The Evidence of History (Strategic Studies) - Removed
  20. 2008-12-06 A Military History of Russia. From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya

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Articles

NATO: The Revolution in Military Affairs


The Revolution in Military Affairs
I. INTRODUCTION*

1. In recent years, weapons technology has leapt forward. Weapons can be delivered with unprecedented precision; surveillance and reconnaissance systems can provide remarkably detailed information about hostile force structures and locations; and a combination of data analysis and distribution systems can allow this information to be rapidly exploited.

2. Most military analysts now agree that advances in military technology require a fundamental reappraisal and revision of operational concepts to ensure that full advantage is taken of them. This combination of technological advances and revisions in operational concepts represents a revolution in military affairs.

II. THE CONCEPT OF A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

3. According to Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of Net Assessments in the Office of the Secretary of Defense:

"A Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organisational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations."[1]

4. Such revolutions have occurred many times in history for a variety of reasons. The most obvious cause is technological "push". The invention of gunpowder, the steam engine, the submarine, the internal combustion engine, the aeroplane, the aircraft carrier, and the atom bomb are some of the most obvious innovations which led to fundamental changes in the conduct of warfare. Some of these technological changes had origins in the civilian world while other revolutions in military affairs were brought about by "social-military revolutions" such as the development of railways, which enabled military forces to be moved and supplied over great distances.

5. There is a debate about what exactly constitutes a "revolution in military affairs". Some analysts maintain that there have been only three and that these have been linked to the nature of the societies: agrarian, industrial, and information. Others have identified as many as fourteen. There is agreement, however, that technology alone is insufficient to bring about a true revolution in military affairs. For example, almost five centuries elapsed between the invention of gunpowder and its large-scale employment on the battlefield; and in the early stages of the Second World War, Germany's innovative operational concept that using communications technologies to integrate land and air forces enabled it to defeat French and British forces equipped with very similar technology. In other words, an appropriate operational concept is just as important as technological invention in bringing about a revolution in military affairs.

III. THE GULF WAR

6. The Gulf War in early 1991 gave an indication of some of the key components of the current revolution in military affairs. The Gulf War saw the military use of information technology at its zenith.[2] New technologies enhanced Coalition forces' ability to exchange and use information, and highlighted the imperative of denying the adversary the ability to communicate with his forces.

7. But the most obvious capability was that of precision strike. New guidance technologies have led to the development of munitions that can be delivered with remarkable precision. These include munitions delivered by aircraft, cruise missiles, and artillery. What is often forgotten is the impact that such munitions have on logistics and operations. The ability to destroy certain targets using one or two precision-guided munitions instead of by large-scale bombing cuts the logistic "tail" dramatically.

8. For instance, during the Gulf War, 6,250 tons of precision-guided munitions were used compared with 81,980 tons of "dumb" bombs. Between 80 and 90 per cent of the precision-guided munitions (PGMs) hit their targets compared with about 25 per cent of dumb bombs.[3] As well as yielding logistic benefits, precision-guided munitions enabled the Coalition forces to minimise collateral damage.[4] It should also be noted that the use of systems such as stealth aircraft and cruise missiles enabled certain attacks to take place against highly defended targets virtually without warning.

9. Equally important but less obvious was the role played by sophisticated surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering systems. These included proven land, air and space systems as well as some prototypes that were pressed into service. Systems included the E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft that provides all-weather surveillance, command, control and communications; the RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic intelligence-gathering aircraft; the prototype Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), as well as a wide variety of photo-reconnaissance aircraft.

10. Extensive use was also made of space assets, both military and commercial, belonging to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia. These provided the Coalition forces with communication, navigation, surveillance, intelligence, and early warning. Using some 60 satellites, Coalition forces had secure strategic and tactical communications enabling time-sensitive information to be exchanged between ground, naval, and air units spread throughout the theatre. [5] Furthermore Coalition forces were able to locate and designate targets with remarkable precision, navigate through the Iraqi desert better than the Iraqis themselves, and find troops in distress faster than ever before thanks to the Global Positioning System (GPS).

11. Another feature of the Gulf War was, of course, the use of Patriot missiles to intercept Iraqi Scud missiles.

12. Much has been written about whether actual performance of precision-guided systems and the Patriot missile interceptor was as impressive as it seemed at the time. Rather less has been made of other shortcomings that were identified such as the presence of many incompatible communications and information systems. Whatever the shortcomings, however, the Gulf War illustrated trends in military technology and provided many lessons for future conflicts.

IV. TECHNOLOGY TRENDS AND NEW AREAS OF WARFARE

13. Current trends in military technology can be categorised in a variety of ways but all present a broadly similar assessment. The following categories were developed by General Gordon Sullivan, former Chief of Staff of the United States Army and co-author Lt.Col. James M. Dubik:

  • Greater lethality
  • Increased volume and precision of fire
  • Better integrative technology leading to increased efficiency and effectiveness
  • Increasing ability of smaller units to create decisive results
  • Greater invisibility and increased detectability.[6]
  • 14. These need little elaboration. Essentially, the trend is towards smaller, more lethal forces, able to deliver a high volume of precise fire through the integration of delivery systems with effective sensor and information distribution systems. At the same time, forces are becoming better able to conceal themselves while their ability to detect hostile forces is increasing.

    15. As with previous revolutions in military affairs, the current revolution is leading to the emergence of new warfare areas. A warfare area is a form of warfare with unique military objectives and is characterised by association with particular forces or systems. Past examples include air warfare, armoured warfare, and strategic bombing, to mention but a few.

    16. As with trends in technology, different categorisations have been developed and all suffer from some degree of overlap. One particularly useful formulation was produced by a team from Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).[7] The team identified four potential new warfare areas - long-range precision strike, information warfare, dominating manoeuvre, and space warfare.

    17. Precision strike systems have been developed since the 1970s and rapid progress continues to be made. Current systems include long-range cruise missiles, and precision-guided munitions delivered by aircraft and artillery. Provided that adequate targeting information is available and can be distributed efficiently, such systems can be used to mount a co-ordinated attack on hostile targets while minimising collateral damage, friendly-fire casualties, and enemy counterstrikes.

    18. According to the SAIC team, "Precision strike, in the context of the ongoing RMA, is the ability to locate high-value, time-sensitive fixed and mobile targets; to destroy them with a high degree of confidence; and to accomplish this within operationally and strategically significant time lines while minimising collateral damage, friendly fire casualties, and enemy counterstrikes."

    19. The team cites a vivid example to illustrate this area of warfare.

    "In 1943, the United States 8th Air Force prosecuted only 50 strategic targets during the course of the entire year. In the first 24 hours of Desert Storm, the combined air forces prosecuted 150 strategic targets - a thousand-fold increase over 1943 capabilities. By the year 2020, it is not out of the realm of possibility that as many as 500 strategically important targets could be struck in the first minute of the campaign - representing a five thousand-fold increase over Desert Storm capabilities."[8] Information warfare is identified as another new warfare area. Although the critical value of information in warfare has been acknowledged since ancient times, warfare nowadays relies on information systems to an unprecedented degree. Information-gathering systems such as reconnaissance and early-warning satellites, a wide variety of manned and unmanned air-based systems, etc. provide huge amounts of data which can be sorted and channelled through advanced information distribution and communications.

    20. Highly capable information systems are a critical force multiplier and at the same time a potential vulnerability. The goal therefore in this area of warfare is to retain effective use of one's own information assets while destroying or disabling the opponent's. Last year's General Report [AP 237 STC (97) 7] examined the potential for using information systems alone as a means of disrupting both civil and military information infrastructure. In open warfare, however, information warfare is taken to include the use of physically destructive means - such as missile attacks and bombing - to knock out key information assets.

    21. Some analysts have gone so far as to add information warfare as a fourth dimension of warfare to the traditional three of air, land, and sea. "As first wave wars were fought over land, and second wave wars were fought over physical resources and productive capacity, the emerging third wave wars will be for the access to and control of knowledge."[9]

    22. Dominating manoeuvre is also seen as a new warfare area. Manoeuvre has always been a key element in military operations, but the revolution in military affairs envisages manoeuvre on a global scale, on a much-compressed time scale, and with greatly reduced forces.

    23. Dominating manoeuvre is defined as the positioning of forces - integrated with precision strike, space warfare, and information war operations - to attack decisive points, defeat the enemy's "centres of gravity", and accomplish campaign or war objectives. These centres of gravity are key points in command, organisation, resources, transport, etc. whose loss would severely erode an opponent's ability to wage war.

    24. Dominating manoeuvre is distinct from traditional concepts of manoeuvre in several ways. Manoeuvre refers to the "employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fires, to achieve a position of advantage in order to accomplish the mission."[10] Dominating manoeuvre refers to the positioning of all the forces that could be brought to bear on a theatre of operations, and the integration of precision strike, space warfare, and information warfare. The goal would be to employ these various assets against the enemy's critical points simultaneously rather than sequentially, and to re-engage those targets whenever necessary.

    25. Ideally, this would entail the employment of new means of movement such as sea transportation systems capable of 100 knots, supersonic air transport, advanced logistic support and perhaps smaller, more self-sufficient field units.

    26. Space warfare is viewed as another new area of warfare. The military importance of space has been clear for over 40 years but only recently has it become possible to envisage an almost seamless integration of space systems into military operations. The utility of space systems for communications is well established but their use for global, real-time surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting is a more recent phenomenon. Space systems also provide precise navigation and meteorological data.

    27. Further into the future, space transportation systems, anti-satellite weapons, missile defences, and even space-based ground attack systems might play important roles in the conduct of military operations although some of these capabilities would raise complex arms control issues that would have to be addressed.

    28. Certainly, the achievement of superiority in space assets would be a critical advantage and its denial to an opponent would be an important war goal.

    Source:

    www.iwar.org.uk

    The Praxis Centre at Leeds Met - Cyberwar, Netwar and the Revolution in Military Affairs

    Cyberwar, Netwar and the Revolution in Military Affairs

    Edited by: Dr Eddie Halpin, Dr Philippa Trevorrow, Professor David Webb & Dr Steve Wright

    The end of the Cold War ushered in a new phase of global security in which new threats and challenges emanate from non-conventional sources, and in which the weapons and means to prosecute war harness new technology. By the mid-1990s terms such as cyberwar and netwar were being used to explain a new way of thinking about war. The intervening years have seen the development of new defence policies, such as the US military Vision for 2020 and the Revolution in Military Affairs, whilst the threat of terrorism has become a painful and sad reality. The period has also seen the development and deployment of a range of new technologies for military operations ranging from new smart mechanisms to deliver weapons to surveillance and communications technologies that can change the very nature of warfare and security. This book attempts to consider this balance between the technologies and policies deployed to respond to terror and the need for human and civil rights.

    PART ONE: CYBERWAR, NETWAR AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS; DEFINING THE ISSUES

    • Introduction: Defining the Issues; P.Trevorrow, S.Wright, D.C.Webb & E.F.Halpin
    • Vitual Violence and Real War: Playing War in Computer Games: The Battle with Reality ; M.Bayer
    • Strategic Information Warfare: An Introduction; G.P.Siroli

    PART TWO: IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROBLEM

    • Virtuous Virtual War; J.Rantapelkonen
    • Risks of Computer-Related Technology; P.G.Neumann
    • Missile Defence - The First Steps towards War in Space?; D.C.Webb
    • Technology as Source of Global Turbulence?; S.Fritsch
    • Nuclear Weapons and the Vision of Command and Control; B.D.Larkin
    • Information Warfare and the Laws of War; G.Darnton

    PART THREE: COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES

    • R.M.A. The Russian Way; F.Pantelogiannis
    • An Overview of the Research and Development of Information Warfare in China; Chris Wu

    PART FOUR: WHAT IS BEING DONE OR MUST BE DONE?

    • A Bridge Too Far?; M.Moore
    • Threat Assessment and Protective Measures: Extending the Asia-Europe Meeting IV Conclusions on Fighting International terrorism and other Instruments to Cyber Terrorism; M.Mauro
    • Policy Laundering and Other Policy Dynamics; I.R.Hosein
    • Conclusion; S.Wright, P.Trevorrow, D.Webb & E.Halpin

    Source:

    praxis.leedsmet.ac.uk

    Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues - Air Theory for the 21st Century, Cyberwar, Biological Weapons and Germ Warfare, New-Era Warfa

    Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues - Air Theory for the 21st Century, Cyberwar, Biological Weapons and Germ Warfare, New-Era Warfare

    This is a book about strategy and war fighting in the midst of a revolution in military affairs as the world moves into the twenty-first century. Its 11 essays examine topics such as military operations against a well-armed rogue state or NASTT (NBC-arming sponsor of terrorism and intervention) state; the potential of parallel warfare strategy for different kinds of states; the revolutionary potential of information warfare; the lethal possibilities of biological warfare; and the elements of an ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA).

    The book's purpose is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies, and threats that will confront US national security decision makers in the twenty-first century. The participating authors are either professional military officers or civilian professionals who specialize in national security issues. Two of the architects of the US air campaign in the 1991 Gulf War have contributed essays that discuss the evolving utility of airpower to achieve decisive results and the lessons that might portend for the future of warfare.

    In "Principles of War on the Battlefield of the Future," which sets the tone for the book, Dr. Barry Schneider examines how traditional principles of war may have to be reassessed in light of a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) among third world states. Regarding the principle of "mass," traditional theory dictated that forces be massed for an offensive breakthrough. But Schneider argues that, against an enemy armed with WMD, dispersed of one's forces may, in fact, be more prudent, and fighting by means of "disengaged combat" prior to a decisive strike may be necessary. This requires high coordination and "superior targeting and damage assessment intelligence, combined with superior high-tech weapons." Still, the United States and its allies would not likely be able to dominate a future battlefield even with advanced conventional arms if they did not have close-in air bases to operate from and thereby to achieve air dominance over the battle space. Therefore, while it sounds good, striking from outside the enemy's range is not a real option for long if the enemy is mounting a ground campaign that is closing in on vital areas. Local air, sea, and ground power will be needed to contain the adversary forces and roll them back. This means local air bases and seaports must be available and protected.

    Contents * Introduction * 1 Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future * Barry R. Schneider * Overview: New Era Warfare? A Revolution In Military Affairs? * 2 New-Era Warfare * Gen Charles A. Horner, USAF, (Ret.) * 3 The Revolution in Military Affairs * Jeffrey McKitrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield and Dale Hill * Overview: Future Airpower and Strategy Issues * 4 Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century * Col John A. Warden III, USAF * 5 Parallel War and Hyperwar: Is Every Want a Weakness? * Col Richard Szafranski, USAF * Overview: Information Warfare Issues * 6 Information War - Cyberwar - Netwar * George Stein * 7 Information Warfare: Impacts and Concerns * Col James W. McLendon, USAF * Overview: Biological Warfare Issues * 8 The Biological Weapon: A Poor Nation's Weapon of Mass Destruction * Lt Col Terry N. Mayer, USAF * 9 Twenty-First Century Germ Warfare * Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, MD, USAF * 10 Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare * Lt Col Robert P. Kadlec, MD, USAF * 11 On Twenty-First Century Warfare * Lawrence E. Grinter and Dr. Barry R. Schneider

    Source:

    www.idefix.com

    FSS: BSS152 Cyber Warfare - Course Information

    Course Information BSS152 Cyber Warfare Faculty of Social Studies
    Autumn 2013 Extent and Intensity 1/1. 6 credit(s). Type of Completion: zk (examination). Teacher(s) Mgr. Martin Bastl, Ph.D. (lecturer)
    Mgr. Jakub Drmola (assistant) Supervisor prof. JUDr. PhDr. Miroslav Mareš, Ph.D.
    Division of Security and Strategic Studies - Department of Political Science - Faculty of Social Studies
    Contact Person: Mgr. Libuše Stará
    Supplier department: Division of Security and Strategic Studies - Department of Political Science - Faculty of Social Studies Timetable Thu 16:00–17:40 U35 Course Enrollment Limitations The course is also offered to the students of the fields other than those the course is directly associated with. Fields of study the course is directly associated with there are 14 fields of study the course is directly associated with, display Course objectives Participants should be able to understand the issue of cyberwar and information war. Students recognize contemporary concepts of warfare. They will discuss about information war in accordance with a broader definition understood as a battle over control of information activities: gathering, storing and processing of information. Students should be able to define information war and the ways it is understood and they should be able to explain its genesis and history, character of cybernetic warfare, techniques, perspectives. Syllabus
    • Outline:
    • 1. Introductory lesson, organizational matters, paper topics.
    • 2. Information society, theory. Concept of the first, second and third wave. Definition of terms.
    • 3. Definition of military concepts.
    • 4. Information war, information security. RMA.
    • 5. Cybernetic war, cybernetic security.
    • 6. Partakers in cybernetic battle. Concept of “netwar”.
    • 7. History of cybernetic warfare.
    • 8. Cybernetic criminality.
    • 9. Technologies and tools of cyberwar.
    • 10. Military use of cybernetic warfare.
    • 11. Cybernetic terrorism.
    • 12. Reading week.
    • 13. End of course. Discussion, paper evaluation.
    Literature
    • Cyberwar, netwar and the revolution in military affairs. Edited by Edward F. Halpin. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. xx, 253. ISBN 1403987173. info
    • MATĚJKA, Michal. Počítačová kriminalita. Vyd. 1. Praha: Computer Press, 2002. x, 106 s. ISBN 80-7226-419-2. info
    • Networks and netwars :the future of terror, crime, and militancy. Edited by John Arquilla - David Ronfeldt. Santa Monica: RAND, 2001. xiv, 375 s. ISBN 0-8330-3030-2. info
    • Počítačová kriminalita :nástin problematiky. kompendium názorů specialistů. Edited by Stanislav Musil. Vyd. 1. Praha: Institut pro kriminologii a sociální prevenci, 2000. 281 s. 3. ISBN 80-86008-80-0. info
    • In Athena's camp :preparing for conflict in the information age. Edited by John Arquilla - David Ronfeldt. Washington: RAND, 1997. xxiv, 501. ISBN 0-8330-2514-7. info
    Teaching methods Lectures, reading, class discussion, homeworks. Assessment methods The course consists of a seminar and a lecture.
    Students must present a paper in order to complete the course successfully. A written exam is to be passed at the end of the course. Maximum of 100 points can be obtained at the exam. At least 60 points must be obtained in order to pass. Evaluation: 0-59 = F, 60-68 = E, 69-77 = D, 78-86 = C, 87-94 = B, 94-100 = A. Language of instruction Czech Further comments (probably available only v češtině) The course is taught annually. Teacher's information Podvodné plnění studijních povinností Výuka na FSS MU předpokládá, že studenti znají studijní předpisy a že se nedopouštějí podvodného plnění studijních povinností, zejména opisování u zkoušek a plagiátorství, tedy vydávání cizích myšlenek za vlastní a přebírání myšlenek jiných autorů bez uvedení autorství. Plagiátorství patří k nejzávažnějším etickým proviněním vakademickém prostředí, popírá poslání university i smysl studia. Z právního hlediska je plagiátorství krádeží cizího duševního vlastnictví. Podvodné plnění studijních povinností nemůže být za žádných okolností na FSS tolerováno. Každý případ podvodného chování bude trestán nejpřísnější sankcí, a to nepodmínečným vyloučením ze studia. Studentům doporučujeme co nejdůkladněji se seznámit sproblémem plagiátorství a se způsoby, jak se mu vyhnout. The course is also listed under the following terms Autumn 2005. Autumn 2006. Autumn 2007. Autumn 2008. Autumn 2009. Autumn 2010. Autumn 2011. Autumn 2012. Autumn 2014. Autumn 2015. Autumn 2016.
    • Enrollment Statistics (Autumn 2013. recent )
    • Permalink: https://is.muni.cz/course/fss/autumn2013/BSS152
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    Source:

    is.muni.cz

    Revolution in Military Affairs

    Revolution in Military Affairs

    The military concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA ) is a theory about the future of warfare. often connected to technological and organizational recommendations for change in the United States military and others.

    Especially tied to modern information, communications, and space technology. RMA is often linked to current discussions under the label of Transformation and total systems integration in the US military.

    Contents History Edit

    The original theorizing was done by the Soviet Armed Forces in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov. [1] The U.S. initially became interested in it through Andrew Marshall. the head of the Office of Net Assessment. a Department of Defense think tank. It slowly gained credence within official military circles, and other nations began exploring similar shifts in organization and technology.

    Interest in RMA and the structure of future United States armed forces is strong within the China's People's Liberation Army and incorporated to current Chinese strategic military doctrine. Many other militaries have researched and considered RMA as an organizational concept, including Canada, United Kingdom. the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Singapore, Republic of China (Taiwan), India, Russia and Germany. However, the infrastructure and investment demands are very expensive for many countries and nations unwilling to invest substantial sums in defense.

    Renewed interest was placed on RMA theory and practice after what many saw as a stunning, one-sided victory by the United States in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. American dominance through superior satellite, weapons-guiding, and communications technology emphasized the enormous relative power of the US through technological advances, even against an Iraqi military that was by no means an insignificant rival.

    After the Kosovo War where the United States did not lose a single life, others suggested that war had become too sterile, creating an almost "Virtual War ." Consequently, the U.S. failure to capture Osama bin Laden and the Iraqi insurgency led some to question RMA's build-up as a military nirvana. U.S. foes may increasingly resort to asymmetrical warfare to counter the advantages of RMA.

    In 1997, the United States Army mounted an exercise code-named "Force 21", to test the application of digital technologies in warfare. The goal of Force 21 was to improve the communications and logistics through the application of computers and information technology generated in the private sector and adapted for military use.

    The specific aims were to increase awareness of one's own position on the battlefield and to have a clear sense of the enemy's position, in pursuit of the following goals: (1) increased lethality, (2) increased control of the tempo of warfare, (3) the reduction of instances caused by friendly fire. with improvement in Identification Friend or Foe. [2]

    Areas of focus Edit

    One of the central problems in understanding the current debate over RMA is due to many theorists' use of the term as referring to the revolutionary technology itself, which is the driving force of change. Concurrently, other theorists tend to use the term as referring to revolutionary adaptations by military organisations that may be necessary to deal with the changes in technology. Other theorists place RMA more closely inside the specific political and economic context of globalization and the end of the Cold War.

    When reviewing the gamut of theories, three fundamental versions of RMA come to the forefront. The first perspective focuses primarily upon changes in the nation-state and the role of an organised military in using force. This approach highlights the political, social, and economic factors worldwide, which might require a completely different type of military and organisational structure to apply force in the future.

    Authors such as RAND's Sean J. A. Edwards (advocate of BattleSwarm tactics), Carl H. Builder and Lt. Col. Ralph Peters emphasized the decline of the nation-state, the nature of the emerging international order, and the different types of forces needed in the near future.

    The second perspective—most commonly assigned the term RMA—highlights the evolution of weapons technology. information technology, military organization. and military doctrine among advanced powers. This "System of Systems" perspective on RMA has been ardently supported by Admiral William Owens. former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who identified three overlapping areas for force assets. These are intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. command, control, communications and intelligence processing. and precision force.

    Advanced versions of RMA incorporate other sophisticated technologies, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), nanotechnology. robotics. and biotechnology. Recently, the RMA debate focussed on "network-centric warfare " which is a doctrine that aims to connect all troops on the battlefield.

    Finally, the third concept is that a "true" revolution in military affairs has not yet occurred or is unlikely to. Authors such as Michael O'Hanlon and Frederick Kagan. point to the fact much of the technology and weapons systems ascribed to the contemporary RMA were in development long before 1991 and the Internet and information technology boom.

    Several critics point out that a "revolution" within the military ranks might carry detrimental consequences, produce severe economic strain, and ultimately prove counterproductive. Such authors tend to profess a much more gradual "evolution" in military affairs, as opposed to a rapid revolution.

    See also Edit References Edit Further reading Edit
    • Alexander, John B. Future War: Non-Lethal Weapons in Twenty-First-Century Warfare. New York, Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin's Griffin, 1999 ISBN 0-312-26739-8
    • Arquilla, John and David F. Ronfeldt (eds.), In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age. Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 1997 ISBN 0-8330-2514-7
    • Barnett, Thomas P.M.. The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century. New York & London, Penguin, 2004 ISBN 0-399-15175-3
    • Broad, William, Judith Miller and Stephen Engelberg, Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War . New York, Simon & Schuster, 2001 ISBN 0-684-87159-9
    • DerDerian, James, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network. Westview Press Inc. 2001 ISBN 0-8133-9794-4
    • Edwards, Sean A. J. Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future. Palo Alto, CA, RAND Research, 2000 ISBN 0-8330-2779-4
    • Gongora, Thierry and Harald von Riekhoff (eds.), Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs. Defense and Security at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 2000 ISBN 0-313-31037-8
    • Gray, Colin S. Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and The Evidence of History. London, Frank Cass, 2004 ISBN 0-7146-8483-X
    • Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire . Hamish Hamilton, 2005 ISBN 0-241-14240-7
    • Henrotin, Joseph, La technologie militaire en question. Paris, Economica, 2008.
    • Kagan, Donald and Frederick W. Kagan. While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness and the Threat to Peace Today. New York, St. Martin's Griffin, 2000 ISBN 0-312-28374-1
    • Krames, Jeffrey A. The Rumsfeld Way. New York & Chicago, McGraw-Hill, 2002 ISBN 0-07-140641-7
    • Landa, Manuel de. War in the Age of Intelligent Machines . New York, Zone Books, 1991 ISBN 0-942299-76-0
    • Rumsfeld, Donald H.. Transforming the Military. in: Foreign Affairs. vol. 81, No. 3, May/June, 2002, pp. 20–32.
    • Ugtoff, Victor (ed.), The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order. Cambridge & London, The MIT Press, 2000 ISBN 0-262-71005-6
    • Cohen, Eliot A. 1995. Come the Revolution. National Review, July 31, 26+.
    • Schwartzstein, Stuart J.D. (ed.), The Information Revolution and National Security: Dimensions and Directions. Washington, D.C. The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1996 ISBN 0-89206-288-6
    • Tomes, Robert R. US Defense Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Innovation and the New American Way of War, 1973-2003, 2007 ISBN 0-415-77252-4
    • John Gordon, "Transforming for What? Challenges Facing Western Militaries Today". Focus stratégique. Paris, Ifri, November 2008.
    External links Edit

    Source:

    military.wikia.com

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